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although he appears to have reached his conclusions independently. ' Throughout the book and in the article above-mentioned, there
is plenty of stimulation for the reader. The text is well filled with
cases illustrating the points which the author makes. The analysis
of the Loach case13 as involving a situation where the defendant
had "the first clear chance," is an artistic stroke. After reading the
book and the article, one feels that the problem of proximate cause
properly dwindles before the larger problems of policy. For making
such an analysis, Professor Green will receive high praise. Moreover, we have here that rare thing, a modern law book which can
actually be read, and with interest, by a busy lawyer or student. It
runs only to 202 pages and is written in a clear, concise and readable
style.

ROBERT H. WETTACH.
University of North Carolina
School of Law.
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""Can't we correctly say that a wrong is not the 'legally blamable' cause of
a concrete sequence if the prevention of that sequence did not fall within the
purpose of the infringed duty?" Bingham, Legal Cause, 9 Col. L. Rev., p. 35.

"Were the chances of occurrence of the consequences which constituted
plaintiff's harm within any of the dangers that provoked legal condemnation
of defendant's conduct? If they were, he is 'legally blamable' for the harm."
Bingham, op. cit., p. 154.
"Legal duties are always concrete; and the determination of the existence
and particular extent of duties is an essential function of the judge." Bingham, op. cit., p. 155.
See discussion of Bingham's articles by Professor Green in his book, pp.
130, 131.
. Loach v. British Co. Elec. Ry. Co. (Privy Council, 1916), 1 Appeal Cas.
719, discussed in 6 N. C. L. Rev., pp. 30, 31, 32.

